Chapter 1487: Year-End Economic Conference

Chapter 1487 -33: Year-End Economic Conference

East Africa has a significant number of colonies along the Persian Gulf coast. This forms the foundation for East Africa’s colonization of the Middle East, and the Middle East and Central Asia are among the primary directions for East Africa’s current economic colonial expansion.

Since the last century, East Africa’s trade in the region has extended eastward to Afghanistan, northward to Central Asia’s Russian heartland, westward to the Red Sea coast, and southward to the Arabian Sea.

However, at that time, East Africa was not a major participant in international affairs in the Middle East and Central Asia. Besides the local countries and powers, the dominant forces in the Middle East and Central Asia were the United Kingdom and Russians.

Other powers were similar to East Africa; due to the lack of military presence in the Middle East and Central Asia, their trade with countries in the region was like water without a source, or wood without roots, unable to compete with Russia and the United Kingdom.

This point is crucial: without military guarantees, Russia and the United Kingdom can engage in unfair competition with other industrial countries. After all, if the discussion truly centered on the quality and price of industrial goods, setting aside the United Kingdom, Russia’s industrial products would definitely collapse in open competition.

But it is precisely because Russia has extensive spheres of influence in Central Asia and the Middle East that guarantees Russia’s shoddy industry can monopolize the local market. Although other countries might also trade within Russia’s sphere, compared to the benefits Russia gains, it’s negligible.

Similarly, East Africa became a new key participant in the Middle East region due to its military presence in the Middle East, which was established during World War I.

The spheres of influence East Africa acquired in the Middle East were, frankly, seized from the United Kingdom and Russia. For example, Qatar, Beibu Gulf, and Gwadar were once spheres of influence of the United Kingdom, while northern Persia was once a Russian sphere.

Although these newly acquired spheres were taken from the United Kingdom and Russians, the concepts of the two are entirely different.

The spheres of influence and colonies East Africa took from the United Kingdom were not areas that the United Kingdom had heavily emphasized. For example, Qatar and Beibu Gulf were included in their sphere last century primarily to manage rampant piracy and protect their trade routes.

Moreover, East Africa has reached relevant agreements with the United Kingdom regarding these colonies. Although East Africa took advantage during World War I to accomplish this, the United Kingdom has no direct reason or excuse to renege.

Persia, however, is entirely different. East Africa entered Persia taking advantage of Tsarist Russia’s collapse, when the new Russian Labor Party regime hadn’t managed to take over these political legacies left by Tsarist Russia, thus, from the Russian Labor Party’s perspective, East Africa appears as an outsider seizing family assets.

Furthermore, the two countries have irreconcilable contradictions in political ideology. At this time, Russia still harbors many fantasists of “world solidarity,” and in achieving this goal, exporting ideology naturally becomes necessary.

Russia’s ideological export undoubtedly undermines the foundations and legalities of current imperialist countries’ rule, so being blocked and interfered with by the International Community is also “justifiable.”

In layman’s terms, suppose Ernst represents the East African regime as a factory, and the current political thought of Russia is to incite the workers of this factory to overthrow the East African Government, the factory owner, thereby acquiring ownership of the factory. This is naturally intolerable to the East African Government.

Thus, from a standpoint of position, the East African Government is not fond of Russia.

The East African Defense Minister, Pripyat, remarked: “Our current sphere in Persia determines that confrontation with Russia is inevitable. Therefore, while supporting Persia, we should also guard against Russian ideological exports.”

“Especially with our imminent military deployment in Persia, we ought to be wary of the Persian Labor Party being supported by the Russian Labor Party attempting to engage and infiltrate our stationed forces.”

Pripyat’s concern is not unfounded; weapons on the ideological level are always difficult to guard against. Russia’s recent offensive in Ukraine exemplifies this thoroughly.

The substantial advantage Russia gained in Ukraine was not fundamentally due to the strength of its military force, but rather that its ideological influence played a significant role, resulting in numerous supporters within Ukraine.

Past historical experiences and facts also prove that soldiers and even spies at the forefront of the confrontation with Russia have a considerable likelihood of being wooed by Russia. In past times, many from countries like the U.S., the U.K., (West) Germany, and France chose to join the Russian Labor Party, like the Cambridge Five from the United Kingdom. If individuals of such backgrounds can be swayed by the Labor Party’s political ideology, then much less so for rank-and-file personnel.

Responding to this point, Ernst said: “Our soldiers, intelligence personnel, logistics staff in Persia, etc., should be strengthened in psychological construction to prevent being swayed by Russia.”

“Meanwhile, the Persian Government should cooperate with us in fortifying defenses against Labor Party organizations domestically. Err on the side of caution, perhaps executing a thousand wrongly rather than letting one escape, while also bolstering negative propaganda against Russia in the media, especially concerning revelations of Russian bureaucracy and social issues, such as the Russian peasant groups, which make excellent propaganda subjects.”

“We can use artistic processing to create a negative image of the Labor Party among the public, thereby significantly reducing the Russian Labor Party’s infiltration into East Africa.”